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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants,

Case No. 19695

and
AMERICAN MOTORS SALES CORPORATION
and JEEP CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
American Motors Sales Corporation and
Jeep Corporation

Appellants American Motors Sales Corporation and
Jeep Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "AMC/Jeep"),
respectfully submit this Reply Brief in answer to the new
matters set forth in the brief of plaintiffs-respondents
Deborah Whitehead and Stephen Whitehead.
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INTRODUCTION
On this appealf AMC/Jeep seeks reversal of the

{

trial court's judgment on the grounds that the trial court
made incorrect and prejudicial rulings on questions of law
and with respect to the admissibility of certain evidence.

(

Specifically, AMC/Jeep argued in its opening brief to this
Court that the trial court erred (a) in permitting plaintiffs
to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory evidence (App. Br.

{

at 26-36); (b) in denying AMC/Jeep's fundamental right to
cross-examine plaintiffs' witnesses (App. Br. at 36-42); (c)
in refusing to permit AMC/Jeep to rebut such evidence by

,

excluding substantial portions of AMC/Jeep's own evidence
(App. Br. at 42-56); (d) in denying AMC/Jeep's motion for
mistrial based on improper closing arguments by opposing
counsel (App. Br. at 56-59); (e) in refusing to permit appellant Jeep Corporation to amend its answer to include a statute of limitations defense (App. Br. at 68-73); (f) in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of AMC/Jeep in light of
their statute of limitations defense (App. Br. at 73-74); and
(g) in excluding all evidence relating to the presence of and
plaintiffs' failure to utilize available seat belts.

(App.

Br. at 59-68).
In their responsive brieff plaintiffs selectively
address a few of the errors cited by AMC/Jeep but wholly
ignore others.

For examplef AMC/Jeep assigns error to the

admission by the trial court of three films showing Jeep
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CJ5sf not Commandos, overturning under artificially induced
conditions wholly dissimilar to the conditions of plaintiffs'
accident (App. Br. at 27-31 ) f and a chart purporting to show
the so-called "roll-over threshold" of a Commando, but which
wasf in factf based entirely upon information obtained by
plaintiffs' expert in testing CJ5s.

(App. Br. at 32). In

their responsive brief, however, plaintiffs attempt to justify admission by the trial court of only one of the three
films.

No mention is made of the other two films or the

chart erroneously received in evidence by the trial court.
(Res. Br. at 19-27).
In defense of the trial court's limitation of
AMC/Jeep's right to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts, the
respondents' brief principally argues the volume of crossexamination permitted without directly addressing the prejudicial effect of the specific limitations raised in appellants' brief.

Respondents further attempt to distract the

Court's attention from the substantive errors below by deliberately mischaracterizing the tone and intent of appellants'
brief as a personal attack on the integrity of the presiding
trial judge.

Such, of course, is not the case.

The record

merely reflects that the court below misunderstood the legal
framework in which this case was presented, the elements of
plaintiffs' cause of action, plaintiffs' burden of proof,
AMC/Jeep's defensive theories, the relevance of defendants'
evidentiary proffers and the complete irrelevance of the
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I

majority of plaintiffs1 expert testimony.

(See App. Br. at

26-27).
Similarly, in their effort to defend the trial
court's exclusion of substantially all of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence, plaintiffs suggest that the exclusions
constituted "sanctions" imposed by the trial court for alleged discovery abuse by AMC/Jeep.

As the record clearly

reflects, however, no motion for sanctions was ever made by
plaintiffs and none of AMC/Jeep's evidence was excluded for
that reason.

In every instance, AMC/Jeep's evidence was

excluded based upon the trial court's failure to comprehend
its relevance.

The judgment below must be reversed and the

case remanded for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY PRE-TRIAL RULINGS
Plaintiffs attempt to defend the trial court's
evidentiary rulings against AMC/Jeep on the ground that such
rulings are, in fact, "sanctions imposed by the trial court
as a result of AMC/Jeep's failure to make discovery."

(Resp.

Br. at 11). Plaintiffs' arguments in this regard fail for
three independent reasons.

First, AMC/Jeep responded fully,

or objected to, all of plaintiffs' discovery requests.
Second, plaintiffs' discovery did not request from AMC/Jeep
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information relating to the demonstrative evidence erroneously excluded by the trial court.

Third, plaintiffs1 never

moved the trial court to sanction AMC/Jeep nor did the trial
court ever indicate that it was sanctioning AMC/Jeep for any
discovery abuse.
A.

Plaintiffs1 Brief Fails to Present
the Complete History of the Pretrial
Proceedings in this Case — AMC/Jeep
Responded to all of Plaintiffs'
Discovery.

A comparison of AMC/Jeep's criticism of the trial
court's evidentiary rulings to plaintiffs' defense of those
rulings might lead the reader to wonder whether the parties
are speaking about the same trial. AMC/Jeep's arguments
regarding the trial court's exclusion of virtually all of
AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence underscore the relevance of
such evidence both as rebuttal evidence and to show state-ofthe-art.

(Pet. Br. at 52-56).

Plaintiffs' arguments in

defense of the trial court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's evidence, on the other hand, center on references to certain
pre-trial proceedings.

(Resp. Br. at 5-19, 38-49).

So the

record is crystal clear on this point, the Court should be
aware that the following portions of the record comprise all
of the interrogatories, motions and hearings regarding pretrial discovery in this case.

As is detailed in full below,

there is nothing in these pleadings and transcripts which
supports plaintiffs' charge that the trial court's erroneous
evidentiary rulings are supported by pre-trial activity in
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(

this case:

(1) Plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories -

March 4, 1981 (R. 128); (2) Plaintiffs' motion to compel
answers to interrogatories - July 6, 1981 (R. 134); (3)
American Motors' answers to interrogatories - July 20f 1981
(R. 216); (4) American Motors opposition to plaintiffs'
motion to compel - July 21f 1981 (R. 236); (5) plaintiffs'
second set of interrogatories - September 15f 1981, (R. 246,
256); (6) plaintiffs' motion to compel, referring to first
set of interrogatories already answered by American Motors November 12, 1981 (R. 257); (7) plaintiffs' motion to compel,
referring to second set of interrogatories - August 4, 1982
(R. 588); (8) AMC/Jeep's answers to second set of interrogatories - August 13, 1982 (R. 614); (9) plaintiffs' motion
to strike or to compel - August 20, 1982 (R. 641); (10)
AMC/Jeep's memorandum opposing motion to compel or strike September 14, 1982; (11) hearing before Judge Sorenson (T.,
10/29/82, at 1-49; R. 5006-5055); (12) hearing before Judge
Sorenson (T., 12/29/82, at 1-16; R. 5056-5072); (13)
AMC/Jeep's supplemental answers to interrogatories - January
25, 1983 (R. 755); (14) plaintiffs' motion in limine October 7, 1983 (R. 1063); (15) minute entry regarding motion
in limine - October 7, 1983 (R. 1365); (16) transcript of
trial court's consideration of motion in limine, October 27,
1983 (T., 10/27/83, at 1555-1576; R. 3337-3358).
Plaintiffs' recount of the pre-trial proceedings in
this case is as incomplete as it is misleading.
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For example,

plaintiffs fail to mention the pleadings numbered (2), (4),
and (13) above.

The complete chronological recapitulation of

those proceedings that follows reveals an utter lack of
foundation for any "sanction," let alone a purported
"sanction" of the devastating magnitude that resulted from
the trial court's erroneous evidentiary rulings.
Plaintiffs filed and served their first set of
interrogatories to American Motors Corporation and Jeep
Corporation on or about March 4, 1981.

(R. 128). Plaintiffs

moved to compel answers to this set of interrogatories on
July 6, 1981.

(R. 134). Plaintiffs1 neglect to point out to

this Court that American Motors provided timely answers and
objections to this set of interrogatories on July 20, 1981.
(R. 216-233).

This response was complete, comprising more

than 15 pages.

Plaintiffs also fail to note that American

Motors responded fully to their motion to compel on July 21,
1981.

(R. 236).
Plaintiffs served their second set of interrog-

atories on American Motors Corporation and Jeep Corporation
on September 15, 1981.

(R. 246, 256). Plaintiffs next filed

a Motion for Order Compelling Discovery on November 12, 1981.
(R. 257). However, as the memorandum accompanying that
motion makes clear, plaintiffs1 motion is directed entirely
to American Motors1 answers to plaintiffs1 first set of
interrogatories.

(R. 259-265).

This first set of inter-

rogatories had already been answered by American Motors.
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Plaintiffs did nothing with respect to its discovery of AMC/Jeep's information for the next seven months.

i

On August 4, 1982f howeverf plaintiffs filed a pleading
styled "Third Motion for Order Compelling Discovery."
588).

(R.

Here, for the first (not the third) time, plaintiffs

i

moved the trial court to compel answers to plaintiffs1 second
set of interrogatories served on September 15, 1981.
AMC/Jeep responded by filing complete answers and objections
to this set of interrogatories on August 13, 1982.
636).

<

(R. 614-

Once again, AMC/Jeep's response was extensive, com-

prising some 21 pages.

Included in this response was a list

(

of 240 different drawings, blueprints and plans relating to
the design and development of the Commando.

(R. 632-635).

These drawings, blueprints and plans were made available to
plaintiffs and were completely responsive to plaintiffs'
interrogatories.
Plaintiffs next tactic, on August 20, 1982, was to
move to strike AMC/Jeep's answers to both sets of interrogatories or, in the alternative, to compel.

(R. 641-642).

AMC/Jeep filed a memorandum opposing plaintiff's motion on
September 14, 1982.

(R. 671-642).

In that memorandum,

AMC/Jeep explained that many of plaintiffs' interrogatories
were not answerable by AMC/Jeep due to the fact that the
Commando vehicle at issue in this lawsuit was designed prior
to 1966 by a predecessor corporation and that many records
were either difficult to locate or no longer in existence.
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AMC/Jeep offered to allow plaintiffs' counsel to depose any
of its personnel who might have relevant knowledge.

That

offer was never acted on by plaintiffs.
At this stage of the pre-trial proceedings,
AMC/Jeep emerges as anything but the recalcitrant litigant
portrayed in plaintiffs' brief.

Rather, AMC/Jeep had re-

sponded to all pending discovery and had responded fully to
plaintiffs' charges that those answers were inadequate.
B.

Plaintiffs' Interrogatories did not
Request Information Bearing on the
Demonstrative Evidence Erroneously
Excluded by the Trial Court.

Despite the fact that AMC/Jeep had responded fully
to their interrogatories and motions, and despite the fact
that AMC/Jeep had offered to permit plaintiffs to interrogate
AMC/Jeep personnel to amplify such responses, plaintiffs
brought their complaints about AMC/Jeep's responses before
the trial court. Judge Sorenson presiding, on October 29,
1982.

At that hearing, the trial court, in an effort "to cut

the Gordian knot in this case right now," (T., 10/29/82, at
4; R. 5010), commenced reading the disputed interrogatories
one by one.

(IcL, at 9-49; R. 5015-5055).

Despite plain-

tiffs' dramatic assertions to the contrary, (see Resp. Br. at
5-19), the net effect of Judge Sorenson's exercise is extremely difficult to determine.

As Judge Sorenson himself

noted during the course of this hearing:

"We are making a

terrible record here, a dreadful record.

I wouldn't want to
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{

be arguing it right as of now before an appellate court."
(1(3. , at 38; R. 5044).

{

Plaintiffs1 contentions at the hearing centered
on their alleged inability to obtain from AMC/Jeep certain
information regarding the design and development of the 1972
Jeep Commando.

{

Plaintiffs never requested information either

with respect to Jeep CJ5 vehicles or with respect to films or
tests of other vehicles or even with respect to films or
tests prepared after 1972.

<

Judge Sorenson comprehended fully

the limited scope of plaintiffs1 interrogatories and
restricted his observations on many of the interrogatories as

i

follows:
I will have you give them all available
information or reasonably retrievable
information as regards the 1972 model
[Commando] only. Now that is all I can
do Mr. Howard.
(Id., at 12; R. 5018; see also Ld., at 13-15; R. 5019-5021).
Judge Sorenson's limitation of his comments to "the 1972
[Commando] model only" is critical.

Judge Sorenson recog-

nized, and plaintiffs1 arguments to Judge Sorenson emphasized, that plaintiffs' interrogatories sought only information regarding the design and development of the 1972
Commando.
The AMC/Jeep evidence which would later be excluded
by Judge Bullock was not responsive either to the letter of
plaintiffs1 interrogatories or to the spirit of those interrogatories as interpreted by Judge Sorenson.

As amplified in
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<

AMC/Jeep's Brief, Judge Bullock excluded the following evidence proffered by AMC/Jeep, none of which relates to the
design and development of the 1972 Commando:

(1) a 1983 film

showing a 1979 model Jeep CJ5 undergoing emergency maneuvers
and remaining upright (T., 10/27/83, at 1557, 1559, 15631566, 1570-1571; R. 3339, 3341, 3345-3348, 3352-3353); (2) a
film showing six non-Jeep vehicles (a 1977 Datsun B-210
passenger car, a 1978 Toyota Corolla passenger car, a 1979
Chevrolet Chevette passenger car, a 1980 Toyota 4-wheel-drive
pickup, a 1981 Ford Bronco utility vehicle, and a 1982 Datsun
4-wheel-drive pickup) with different centers of gravity than
the Commando, showing that they all roll over under the same
maneuvers depicted in plaintiffs' experts' films (I_d., at
1571-1572; R. 3353-3354; T. 10/28/83, at 1745-1746; R. 35283529); (3) a film showing exemplar vehicles —

a Commando and

an Oldsmobile similar to the automobile driven by defendant
Larry Anderson which struck plaintiffs Commando from the rear
—

undergoing certain tests intended to simulate plaintiffs'

accident (T., 10/31/83, 1937-1938; R. 3724-3725); (4) a
series of photographs depicting human beings in an exemplar
vehicle in positions similar to those plaintiffs found themselves in during the course of their accident (iQ., at 19621967; R. 3749-3754); (5) a film demonstrating occupant movement and damage during rollover (i^d., at 1985; R. 3773); (6)
an exhibit demonstrating the fact that the accident vehicle
had been involved in a prior accident (id,, at 2024-2026; R.
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3812-3814); and (7) a film showing an exemplar vehicle, a
Commando, undergoing certain tests and maneuvers with outriggers attached (.id., at 1973; R. 3774).

None of this evidence

excluded by the trial court was responsive to plaintiffs1
interrogatories, because none of this evidence related to the
design and development of the 1972 Commando.

In fact, much

of it was relevant primarily as rebuttal evidence to issues
raised by plaintiffs1 presentation of their case-in-chief.
Most certainly, plaintiffs have identified no interrogatory
and no statement by Judge Sorenson which would have required
AMC/Jeep to produce these films, charts and photographs to
plaintiffs prior to trial.
C.

Plaintiffs Never Moved for, nor did
the Trial Court Impose, any Sanctions
Against AMC/Jeep.

Judge Sorenson continued his recitation of plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories on December 29, 1982.
At this point, plaintiffs' counsel asked Judge Sorenson for
sanctions based on an asserted failure by AMC/Jeep to comply
with plaintiffs' versions of what had occurred at the October
29 hearing.

(T., 12/29/82, at 3-6; R. 5059-5062).

Sorenson stated:

"All right, I will entertain your request

for sanctions if you will follow the rules."
5062).

Judge

(16^., at 6; R.

Plaintiffs responded that they "will make an ap-

propriate motion for sanctions."

(Id_., at 7; R. 5063).

No

such motion was ever filed by plaintiffs and no ruling concerning sanctions was ever made by the trial court in this
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case.

Judge Sorenson continued through plaintiffs1 second

set of interrogatories, commenting along the way on the
opaqueness of plaintiffs1 language:
I am going to make an observation as an
attorney, Mr. Johnson [plaintiffs1
counsel], not as a Judge: The English
language can be extremely treacherous,
and some of these interrogatories — this
is merely my observation as a student of
the language of the law — are not well
phrased in my opinion as a lawyer, not as
a Judge.
....

There is an absence of specificity in
these interrogatories generally.
(Ld., at 10, 12; R. 5066, 5068).

In this respect, Judge

Sorenson qualified many of his comments in the following
fashion:

"I will grant you permission to seek the informa-

tion you seek by interrogatory number twenty seven after you
have clarified precisely what it is you are asking."
at 11; R. 5067;

see also icL, at 12; R. 5068).

(Id.,

No such

clarification was ever attempted by plaintiffs.
In short, the net result of Judge Sorenson's exercise, as outlined above, was to prod both parties into concluding discovery in this case in a reasonable manner.

The

trial court criticized the lack of clarity in plaintiffs'
interrogatories and directed them to clarify the interrogatories before AMC/Jeep would be required to answer many of
them.

AMC/Jeep was directed to provide such answers as were

available to those interrogatories that were capable of being
understood.

Most importantly, however, and as noted above
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(

but totally ignored in plaintiffs1 Brief, Judge Sorenson
contemplated that a formal motion for sanctions would have to

<

be filed by plaintiffs in the event plaintiffs wished to
claim that AMC/Jeep thereafter failed to respond in good
faith to the court's comments and suggestions.
minute entry in this regard is clear:

The court's

<

"The court will enter-

tain plaintiff's request for sanctions providing Mr. Johnson
follows the rules of practice."

(R. 729). Judge Sorenson

<

could hardly have been more precise in stating that his
comments and suggestions, standing alone, would not form the
basis for sanctions; a motion for sanctions would be required.

No such motion was ever filed by plaintiffs.

(

It

strains credulity, therefore, for plaintiffs to defend the
trial court's challenged rulings on AMC/Jeep's evidence based

<

on Judge Sorenson's comments.
Although plaintiffs never filed their promised
motion for sanctions, AMC/Jeep did file "Supplemental Answers
and Objections to Certain of Plaintiffs' Interrogatories" on
January 25, 1983.

(R. 755). These answers represent

AMC/Jeep's response to Judge Sorenson's suggestions and
comments.

Plaintiffs fail to note in their Brief that

AMC/Jeep in fact responded to Judge Sorenson's suggestions
and comments in this manner.

AMC/Jeep's supplemental answers

were never objected to by plaintiffs and no motion to compel
with respect to them was ever filed by plaintiffs.
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D.

The Trial Court did not Base its
Exclusion of AMC/Jeep's Evidence on
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Plaintiffs1 Motion in Limine, seeking to prevent
AMC/Jeep from presenting certain evidence, was first considered by the trial court on the same day it was filed,
October 7f 1983.

The Motion contained no reference either to

Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or to sanctions.
The trial court's minute entry for this hearing reflects only
the following:
Mr. Howard made a motion for Jeep to be
prevented from raising matters which they
failed to respond to in their answers to
interrogatories. Matter discussed at
length between Court and counsel. The
Court ruled defendant may cross examine,
but is not to bring up new facts which
were not given plaintiff's counsel in
their response to interrogatories; however, if some facts are used and defendant's witness makes a different conclusion, those opinions would be admissible.
(R. 1365).

This synopsis of the day's discussion contains no

hint as to the sweeping evidentiary rulings to be made in the
future by the trial court with respect to AMC/Jeep's crossexamination and evidence.

It states only that AMC/Jeep was

"not to bring up new facts which were not given plaintiffs'
counsel in their response to interrogatories."

It does not

state that AMC/Jeep would be precluded from presenting evidence never requested in plaintiffs' interrogatories.

Nor

does it indicate that AMC/Jeep had failed to respond to
plaintiffs' interrogatories.

Moreover, the last clause
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quoted above runs directly contrary to the trial court's
blockage of AMC/Jeep's legitimate efforts to cross-examine
plaintiffs' experts.

(See App. Br. at 36-42).

Most impor-

tantly, there is absolutely no indication that the trial
court's statements were based in any way on Judge Sorenson's
prior hearings, or that the trial court intended to
"sanction" AMC/Jeep.
The trial judge's sole intimation of reliance on
Judge Sorenson's pre-trial rulings is found in connection
with plaintiffs' presentation of their Motion in Limine, in
chambers, on October 27, 1983.
R. 3337-3358).

(T., 10/27/83, at 1555-1576;

The trial judge heard plaintiffs' version of

Judge Sorenson's hearings and excluded one of AMC/Jeep's
films on the ground that "Plaintiffs were entitled to have,
or to see, the films and test results before the trial pursuant to their discovery interrogatories."
3353).

(I<5., at 1571; R.

A careful review of the record reveals clearly,

however, that this film bore absolutely no relation to any of
plaintiffs' interrogatories.

It was a film made in 1983 of a

Jeep CJ5 and had nothing to do with the 1972 Commando.
fact, the film was not even prepared by AMC/Jeep.
1557-1558; R. 3339-3340).

In

(ld_., at

Plaintiffs' interrogatories never

inquired either into testing of CJ5's or into testing that
occurred in 1983. When counsel for AMC/Jeep protested that
the trial judge had misapprehended Judge Sorenson's intent,
the trial judge clarified his ruling, stating:

"My ruling
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was based not only on that, but on what I consider to be the
Rules of Civil Procedure."

(Id.,

at 1574; R. 3356).

Thus,

even in this single instance when the trial judge referred to
Judge Sorenson's pre-trial hearings, it is not at all clear
that the trial judge intended to rely on those hearings to
support his exclusion of AMC/Jeep evidence.

It is absolutely

clear, however, that even if the trial judge intended to rely
on such hearings, the film excluded by the trial judge on
this occasion was not within the scope of any interrogatory
propounded by plaintiffs to AMC/Jeep.
A review of the trial judge's evidentiary rulings
throughout the trial reveals that such rulings were based on
his view of the relevance of AMC/Jeepfs evidence and crossexamination, not on the transcript of the hearings before
Judge Sorenson.

The trial judge never related his systematic

exclusion of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence to any interrogatory or interrogatories; in fact, such relation was
impossible because plaintiffs1 interrogatories did not relate
to the AMC/Jeep evidence excluded by the trial judge. Moreover, as is amplified in the preceding pages of this Brief,
if the trial judge intended to sanction AMC/Jeep by excluding
evidence crucial to the defense of this lawsuit, plaintiffs
should have, at the least, been required to file a Motion for
Sanctions to which AMC/Jeep could have responded.

Hercules

Drayage Company, Inc. v. Canco Leasing Corp., 24 Ariz. App.
598, 540 P.2d 724, 726 (1975) ("Our interpretation of Rule 37
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would require that the party wishing to avail itself of the
sanctions for failure of discovery must move the court for an

(

order sanctioning the alleged uncooperative party.")
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS' ATTEMPTED DEFENSE OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS IS
UNAVAILING

I

The bulk of plaintiffs' Brief is consumed with the
effort to single out and defend individually several of the
trial court's erroneous evidentiary rulings detailed in
AMC/Jeep's Brief.

(Resp. Br. at 19-38).

Any one of the

trial court's errors, standing alonef would justify reversal
of the judgment on the verdict.

Plaintiffs' attempt to

focus, point by point, on a few selected rulings out of the
many challenged by AMC/Jeep does not blunt the thrust of
AMC/Jeep's argument that the cumulative effect of the trial
court's evidentiary rulings —

its admission of plaintiffs'

irrelevant and inflammatory evidence, combined with its
blockage of AMC/Jeeps's efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs'
expertsf combined with its exclusion of substantial portions
of AMC/Jeep's evidence —

requires that the trial court's

judgment on the verdict be reversed.

The flaws inherent in

plaintiffs' particular points are set out below.
A.

The Dynamic Science Film was Irrelevant and Unduly Prejudicial and
Should Have Been Excluded

Plaintiffs discuss at length the admissibility of
the so-called Dynamic Science film.

(Resp. Br. at 19-27).
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This discussion is in apparent response to Point I of
AMC/Jeep's Brief wherein this film, along with two other
films introduced by plaintiffs and one of plaintiffs' expert's charts, are shown to be irrelevant to the issues of
this lawsuit.

(App. Br. at 26-36).

Plaintiffs' decision to

defend only one of the several demonstrative films and exhibits challenged in AMC/Jeep's Brief is not explained in
plaintiffs' Brief, but in any event AMC/Jeep's challenge to
the receipt in evidence of the other two films is not disputed by plaintiffs.
Turning to the Dynamic Science film, it will be
recalled that AMC/Jeep's objection to this film and virtually
all of plaintiffs' demonstrative evidence and expert testimony centered on its lack of relevance to the only issues
in plaintiffs' case against AMC/Jeep:

(a) whether the plain-

tiffs' 1972 Commando was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous when it left the hands of the manufacturer
because it rolled over when struck from behind, on an interstate highway, by a vehicle traveling approximately 70 miles
per hour, and (b) whether the alleged design defect was a
proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries.

Rather than bearing

on the above issues, the Dynamic Science film shifted the
focus of this case away from plaintiffs' accident towards a
rambling investigation of Jeep vehicles, not Commandos, in
general.

As plaintiffs' own witness candidly explained, the

"defect" presented to the trial court and jury by plaintiffs
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"may not have anything to do with this particular accident."
(T., 10/25/83, at 934; R. 2714).
The Dynamic Science film defended in plaintiffs'
Brief is perhaps the best example of the irrelevant and
inflammatory nature of plaintiffs1 evidence.

The film's lack

of relevance is detailed at pages 28-29 of AMC/Jeep's opening
Brief.

Suffice it to note here that the film showed Jeep

CJ5's, not Commandos, and was explained by an expert who had
never tested a Commando.

More importantly, the maneuvers

depicted in the film were never shown to bear any relationship to the circumstances of plaintiffs' accident.

Simi-

larly, the movement of the anthropomorphic dummies seated in
the CJ5 was never shown to bear any resemblance to plaintiffs' movement during the course of their accident.
Plaintiffs' statement in their Brief that "Mr.
Noettl testified that the CJ-5 on the film demonstrated
handling reactions substantially similar to the manner in
which the Jeep Commando would respond under circumstances and
conditions prevalent in this accident," (Resp. Br. at 20), is
a misstatement of the record.
testimony.

Mr. Noettl never offered such

In fact, Mr. Noettl could make no such statement

because he had never tested a Commando nor had he reconstructed plaintiffs' accident.
2907).

(T., 10/26/83, at 1182; R.

Mr. Noettl was utilized by plaintiffs primarily to

testify that "Jeeps," as a generic class of vehicles, are
easier to overturn than a "passenger car."

Id. at 1262; R.
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3039).

Plainly, Mr. Noettl was incompetent to render the

Dynamic Science film relevant to the issues in this case.
Plaintiffs also state that Mr. Noettl testified
that "the tests that were appropriate for conditions basically similar to that giving rise to this litigation were the
J Turn and the obstacle avoidance maneuver [depicted in the
film].

(R. 2972)."

(Resp. Br. at 21). A review of the

record cited by plaintiffs for this statement reveals that
Mr. Noettl is referring to the tests shown in the film but in
no way relates those tests to plaintiffs1 accident.

Here, as

throughout his testimony, Mr. Noettl assumes the role of one
testifying to a legislative or administrative committee about
the characteristics of off-road vehicles in general.

His

testimony, and the film he utilized to illustrate that testimony, are not relevant to the issues in this lawsuit.
Contrary to the insistence of plaintiffs that Mr. Noettl
"testified that the film was material, for it demonstrated
the rollover threshold of the Jeep Commando under circumstances similar to that which occurred on the day and place
of the accident," (Resp. Br. at 21-22), plaintiffs are unable
to cite any place in the record where such a foundation was
laid.

In fact, plaintiffs' counsel went so far as to stipu-

late that the film did not simulate the conditions prevailing
at the time of the accident.

(T., 10/26/83, at 1207; R.

2984).
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Plaintiffs respond inadequately to AMC/Jeep's
argument that plaintiffs' experts' films should have been

{

excluded because they lacked "a foundational showing ... that
the tests were conducted under conditions substantially
similar to actual conditions."

Collins v. B.F. Goodrich Co.y

558 F.2d 908f 910 (8th Cir. 1977).

Plaintiffs' Brief simply

ignores the established rule which places "the burden ...
upon the party offering evidence of out-of-court experiments
... to lay a proper foundation demonstrating a similarity of
circumstances and conditions."

Barnes v. General Motors

Corp., 547 F.2d 275f 277 (5th Cir. 1977).

Plaintiffs' at-

tempt to distinguish Haynes v. American Motors Corporationf
691 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1982), is simply disingenuous.

The

trial court in Haynes ruled that a commercial film showing a
Jeep CJ5 in off-road situations was irrelevant and inadmissible because neither the vehicle depicted nor the maneuvers
illustrated in the film bore any relation to the plaintiffs'
vehicle or circumstances.

The case is directly on point and

underscores the trial court's evidentiary errors below.
B.

Plaintiffs Fail to Justify the Trial
Court's Erroneous Limitation of
AMC/Jeep's Cross-Examination of
Plaintiffs' Experts

AMC/Jeep's opening Brief details, with full citation to the record, the trial court's blockage of AMC/Jeep's
efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts on their crucial
opinion that "Jeeps," as a class of vehicles, overturned much
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more readily than other vehicles and that non-Jeep vehicles
would not have overturned under the circumstances of plaintiffs' accident.

(App. Br. at 36-42).

(See T., 10/25/83, at

1001-1005, 1018; R. 2780-2784, 2797; T., 10/26/83, at 1266,
1275; R. 3043, 3052).
Plaintiffs' respond to AMC/Jeep's argument by
defending the trial court's "position in legal circles and
his prominence among his colleagues, both before and after
appointment to the bench ...." (Resp. Br. at 27-28).

Counsel

for AMC/Jeep certainly do not disagree with plaintiffs'
assessment of the trial court's reputation, but it is facts
and law, not gratuitous reference to the trial court's
reputation and ability, which must govern the outcome of this
appeal.
Plaintiffs intimate that their experts' comparison
of "Jeeps" to other vehicles was not elicited on direct
examination by plaintiffs' counsel and that the trial court's
blockage of AMC/Jeep's cross-examination on this point was
proper.

(Resp. Br. at 32). Quite contrary to plaintiffs'

suggestion, plaintiffs' experts rendered their opinion that
"Jeeps" compared unfavorably to "other vehicles" under direct
examination by plaintiffs' counsel.

(T., 10/20/83, at 558-

560; R. 2331-2333 [direct examination by Mr. Howard]; T.,
10/25/83, at 896-897; R. 2676 [direct examination by Mr.
Howard]).
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Plaintiffs next attempt to confuse the issue by
noting that AMC/Jeep was, indeed, allowed to voir dire and
cross-examine their witnesses on several topics.
at 28-35).

(Resp. Br.

What plaintiffs neglect to point out is that the

pages of the record to which they cite involve voir dire and
cross-examination on issues wholly unrelated to the critical
opinion offered by these experts that a "Jeep" overturns in
circumstances in which "some other car" would not have overturned.
The entire point of AMC/Jeep1s argument in this
regard, that plaintiffs' experts were permitted to compare
"Jeeps" to other vehicles but that AMC/Jeep was blocked from
cross-examining on this point, is utterly ignored in plaintiffs argument.

Similarly, plaintiffs never address the

documented charge of AMC/Jeep that "[t]he practical effect of
the trial court's restriction of appellants' right of crossexamination was to allow plaintiffs' theory of the case to go
unchallenged.

Plaintiffs' experts were allowed to testify

repeatedly and without foundation that 'Jeeps' performed
poorly in comparison to other vehicles, yet AMC/Jeep was
prohibited from exploring the basis for that comparison."
(App. Br. at 39).
C.

The Trial Court's Exclusion of Virtually All of Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Evidence is Plain Error

AMC/Jeep has detailed the trial court's exclusion
of AMC/Jeep's evidence which would have demonstrated that the
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tests depicted in plaintiffs' films bore no relation to
emergency driving conditions and that "Jeeps" in general and
Commandos in particular are reasonably stable vehicles which
can successfully negotiate realistic emergency situations.
(App. Br. at 42-56).
Plaintiffs respond to AMC/Jeeps contentions by
shifting focus, once again, from the facts and the law.
Plaintiffs' charge that AMC/Jeep has charged the trial court
with "incompetence and corruption".

(Resp. Br. at 39).

Suffice it to say that such arguments are as unfounded as
they are gratuitous.
Plaintiffs next rehash their argument concerning
the pre-trial proceedings in this case.

The full and undeni-

able fallaciousness of plaintiffs' argument in this regard is
revealed by their statement that the subject of the film
offered by AMC/Jeep's expert, Mr. Heitzman, had been "previously specifically barred" by Judge Sorenson.
40).

(Resp. Br. at

Judge Sorenson never did any such thing.
First, the film at issue would have been utilized

by Mr. Heitzman to illustrate his opinion concerning the
handling qualities of the CJ5. The film was plainly relevant
because the CJ5 had been much maligned by plaintiffs' experts
and plaintiffs had presented to the jury the notion that the
CJ5 and plaintiffs' Commando were identical.

Plaintiffs can

point to no interrogatory reviewed by Judge Sorenson which
requests any information concerning the CJ5.

Second, as has
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been previously made clear, Judge Sorenson stated explicitly
to plaintiffs that a motion for sanctions would have to be

{

filed before the trial court would consider imposing any
sanctions.

No such motion was ever filed, either before

Judge Sorenson or before the trial judge.

Once again, plain-

tiffs make no attempt to defend the actual basis for the
trial judge's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's evidence; the erroneous
belief that such evidence was irrelevant.
It must be noted that plaintiffs make no attempt
whatsoever to defend the trial court's exclusion of Mr.
Heitzman's film showing vehicles with "outriggers" attached
undergoing certain maneuvers.

(See App. Br. at 44-47).

This

film was essential to demonstrate not only that plaintiffs'
film of a Commando equipped with outriggers was misleading,
but also that many vehicles besides "Jeeps" will roll over
under the conditions depicted in plaintiffs' films.
Plaintiffs next argue that AMC/Jeep is precluded
from challenging the trial court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's
demonstrative evidence because "[m]atters not admitted in
evidence before the trier of fact will not be considered on
appeal before the Supreme Court."

(Resp. Br. at 45, quoting

Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450, 453
(Utah 1983)).

Pilcher has nothing to do with AMC/Jeep's

challenges to the trial court's evidentiary rulings in this
case.

The errors cited by AMC/Jeep were carefully preserved

through proffers reflected in the record before this Court.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

Plaintiffs next defend the trial court's exclusion
of two films offered to demonstrate the testimony of
AMC/Jeep's expert Dr. Warner.

The first of these films would

have demonstrated the weaknesses in plaintiffs' experts'
opinion that "Jeeps" overturn more easily than other vehicles.

The second film was of an exemplar Commando equipped

with outriggersf showing that the Commando is a stable vehicle.

(See App. Br. at 47-49).

Plaintiffs attempt to

defend the exclusion of these two manifestly relevant films
with the blithe comment that they were "rejected for the same
reasons applicable to the Heitzman film."
46).

(Resp. Br. at 45-

Once again, plaintiffs raise the issue of Judge

Sorenson's 1982 hearings, but no substance is provided by
plaintiffs to support their argument.
As with plaintiffs' argument concerning the irrelevant evidence admitted by the trial court over AMC/Jeep's
objections, plaintiffs fail to address all of AMC/Jeep's
claims of error in the trial court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's
evidence.

Besides the films referred to above, the trial

court also excluded erroneously a series of photographs
offered to demonstrate Dr. Warner's testimony.

Plaintiffs do

not attempt to defend this action.
Finally, plaintiffs simply ignore AMC/Jeep's arguments that AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence should have been
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admitted to rebut plaintiffs' irrelevant evidence.
at 50-56).

(App. Br.

Although it can be surmised that plaintiffs

j

disagree with the cases and authorities cited by AMC/Jeepf it
is clear that plaintiffs have left AMC/Jeep and this Court no
hint as to the basis for such disagreement.
POINT III
CLOSING ARGUMENTS MADE BY OPPOSING
COUNSEL WERE IMPROPER AND CONSTITUTED
GROUNDS FOR A MISTRIAL
AMC/Jeep has detailed the gross misstatements made
to the jury by opposing counsel during closing arguments.
(App. Br. at 56-59).

Despite the fact that AMC/Jeep had

offered demonstrative evidence to rebut the testimony of
plaintiffs' expertsf and such evidence was kept from the jury
2
by the trial court, counsel for defendant Larry Anderson

Plaintiffs make a two sentence attempt to distinguish one
of the many cases cited by AMC/Jeep for its argument that its
demonstrative evidence was relevant to rebut the opinions of
plaintiffs1 experts. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, the
court in Walker v. Trico Manufacturing Co., Inc., 487 F. 2d
595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974), did
not decide the issue whether state-of-the-art evidence is
relevant to the defense of a strict products liability
action. Rather, as is clear on page 600 of the opinion, the
court held that even if state-of-the-art evidence, standing
alone, was not relevant in the defense of such actions, such
evidence should be permitted to rebut the plaintiff's introduction of similar evidence.
2
At page 20 of AMC/Jeep's Brief a statement made during
closing argument is erroneously attributed to counsel for
defendant Variable Annuity Life. The statement is correctly
attributed to counsel for defendant Larry Anderson on page 57
of the Brief.
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argued as follows:
Why didn't Jeep, having all of the test
data of the plaintiff's experts, knowing
exactly what they had done, even to the
height of the outriggers off the ground;
why didn't they go out and test a
Commando, put some outriggers on there
and to do some testing of their own? Why
didn't they come in here and tell you,
"We have done the same kind of tests that
the plaintiffs did, we have put the same
number of degrees of steer in on a
Commando, and that vehicle wouldn't turn
over; why didn't they do that? I'll tell
you why: They are afraid to do it. They
didn't dare do it. Because they knew
that Commando would turn over.
(T., 11/3/83, at 109; R. 4659).

Similarly, counsel for

plaintiffs argued to the jury that AMC/Jeep had "No positive
proof.

None at all," (ij3., at 32; R. 4582), that "They

[AMC/Jeep] bring no evidence, none at all," (^d.,

at 33; R.

4583), and that AMC/Jeep's experts failed to bring "an ounce
of engineering data." (Ij3., at 35; R. 4585).
The rule stated in AMC/Jeep's opening Brief is that
"a lawyer who has successfully urged the court to exclude
evidence should not be allowed to point to the absence of
that evidence to create an inference that it does not exist."
State v. Dudley, 104 Idaho 849, 664 P.2d 277, 280 (Idaho App.
1983) (quoting the American Bar Association Standards, The
Defense Function, Section 7.8(a) (1971)).

The "mischief"

identified in Dudley is precisely the mischief engaged in by
opposing counsel during their closing arguments.
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As this

Court has recently stated:

"The proper remedy for prejudi-

cial attorney misconduct is to order a new trial." Nelson v.
Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1982).
Plaintiffs argue that "AMC/Jeep is precluded from
now claiming reversible error as a result of counsel's closing argument by way of its failure to timely object to the
alleged prejudicial statements."

(Resp. Br. at 51). Plain-

tiffs fail to note the undeniable fact that AMC/Jeep strenuously objected to these statements and even moved for a
mistrial because of them.

(T., 11/3/83, at 193-197).

It is

of no moment that the objection was not made at the time the
statements were made to the jury.

As the court stated in

Johnson v. Emerson, 103 Idaho 350, 647 P.2d 806, 810-811
(Idaho App. 1982) :
We do not interpret [the rule requiring
timely objections] to require counsel to
raise all objections instantly, during
closing argument itself. Frequent objections during argument, even if proper,
risk alienating the court and may serve
only to emphasize objectionable comment
for the jury.... Rather, we hold that if
counsel elects to raise the alleged
improprieties by a motion for mistrial or
by other appropriate means, before the
case is submitted to the jury, the issue
will be preserved for appeal.
AMC/Jeep objected to, and moved for a mistrial based on, the
quoted comments as soon as closing arguments were concluded
and the jury had left the courtroom.

The objection was

certainly timely and served to preserve the issue for this
appeal.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING
EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO
UTILIZE AVAILABLE SEAT BELTS
A*

Three Members of this Court have
Expressed a View Consistent with the
Rule that a Plaintiff's Failure to
Utilize Available Seat Belts Constitutes a Failure to Mitigate Damages

AMC/Jeep has presented the substantive arguments of
the growing number of courts which allow juries to consider a
plaintiff's failure to utilize seat belts in connection with
the issue of contributory fault and the plaintiff's duty to
mitigate his own damages. AMC/Jeep also contends that the
jury should have been permitted to consider the fact that
plaintiffs' Commando was equipped with seat belts when deciding whether that Commando was defectively designed.

(App.

Br. at 59-68).
Plaintiffs' response to AMC/Jeep's presentation of
the so-called "seat belt defense" issue is flawed from the
outset.

At the very beginning of their argument, plaintiffs

misstate that "[t]here exists no controlling or even helpful
case law within this jurisdiction regarding the issue of
admissibility of evidence related to the use of seat belts."
(Resp. Br. at 53). Plaintiffs fail to note the concurring
opinion of Justice Oaks (joined by Chief Justice Hall and
Justice Durham) in Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, No. 18133;
(Slip Opinion—May 1, 1984) (petition for rehearing filed).
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The plaintiff in Acculog brought suit to recover
damages suffered when his van was destroyed by fire.

One of

the issues at trial was whether the plaintiff's failure to
carry a fire extinguisher in his van was relevant to either
the issue of contributory negligence or the issue of mitigation of damages.

The trial court avoided this issue on the

ground that the parties had stipulated to the amount of
damages.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a

special verdict but the trial court ruled that plaintiff had
no cause of action.

The plaintiff appealed and this court

remanded for a new trial.

In connection with the remandf

Justice Oaks authored a concurring opinion in which he offered "guidance" to the trial court on remand with respect to
the issue of mitigation of damages. With the following
statementf Justice Oaks embraced the arguments utilized by
the courts that have adopted the "mitigation of damages"
approach to the seat belt defense (see Pet. Br. at 61-66):
[T]he amount of damages the plaintiff
would be allowed to recover [after taking
into account comparative negligence] is
subjected to a further reduction dictated
by the common-law rule of mitigation of
damages or what the Restatement calls
"the damages rule as to avoidable consequences ...." Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Section 465 comment c (1965).
This reduction, on which the defendant
has the burden of proof, applies where
the plaintiff is found to have been
negligent in failing to mitigate or avoid
damages and where this negligence is
found to have increased his total damages
beyond what he would have suffered if he
had not been negligent in this manner.
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Slip. Op. at 7 (emphasis added).
Justice Oaks clearly advocates the admissibility of
evidence regarding non-use of available safety devices in his
quotation of the following "well-reasoned" example propounded
by the court in Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W. 2d 118, 121122 n.2 (N.D. 1983):
Assume: X driving a car, and Y driving a
motorcycle, get in an accident. Y is not
wearing a helmet. The jury finds X is 60
percent liable for causing the accident
[the "injury" under Section 78-27-37],
making Y, the motorcyclist, 40 percent
liable for causing the accident. The
jury also finds Y would have avoided 60
percent of his injuries [damages] if he
had worn a helmet; X is 40 percent liable
for causing Y's [damages]. Y proves
$100,000 in damages.
On the basis of these findings, the
$100,000 award would be reduced by 40
percent, which account for Y's contributing to the cause of the accident. Hence,
the award is diminished to $60,000.
The $60,000 should now be reduced to
the extent that Y's [damages] would have
been [avoided] had he worn a helmet,
i.e., 60 percent. This adjustment leaves
a total award of $24,000.
Id., at 8 n.l.
The issue before this Court does not involve any
argument that plaintiffs caused their accident by failing to
use their seat belts.

Rather, AMC/Jeep's argument to this

Court is found in the third paragraph quoted above; plaintiffs' damages should be reduced by the amount that their
damages would have been "avoided" had they worn their seat
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belts.

Surely, if three members of this Court would consider

non-use of a motorcycle helmet relevant to such an inquiry,
evidence of non-use of the universally available seat belt is
also relevant.
This is precisely the view espoused by many courts
that have permitted juries in product liability cases involving automobiles to consider a plaintiff's failure to utilize
available seat belts in determining the plaintiff's damages.
See Insurance Company of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So.
2d 447, 454 (Fla. 1984); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y. 2d 444, 323
N.E. 2d 164, 167 (1974).

These cases, and Justice Oaks'

opinion, are consistent with Prosser's indication that the
plaintiff's duty to mitigate his damages is equivalent to the
doctrine of avoidable consequence, which precludes recovery
for any damages which could have been eliminated by reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff.

W. Prosser,

Handbook of the Law of Torts Section 65, pp. 442-444 (4th Ed.
1971).
Although this concept has been applied most often
to post-accident conduct, courts recognize that this does not
preclude its application to pre-accident conduct. Plaintiffs' claim that "the duty to mitigate damages cannot arise
before the plaintiff is damaged," (Resp. Br. at 62-66),
exalts theory over common sense and sound policy.

Evidence

of a plaintiff's failure to utilize an available seat belt
should be admitted because seat belts afford the automobile
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occupant an unusually effective means by which a person "may
minimize his or her injuries prior to an accident."

Spier v.

Barker, 323 N.E. 2d, at 168. The simple fact is that in many
cases, as in this one, it can be demonstrated that the failure of a plaintiff to use an available seat belt exacerbated
the plaintiff's injuries.

See Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary

Approach to Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 217, 231235 (1980).
B.

Plaintiffs' Knowledge, or Lack of
Knowledge, With Respect to the Presence of Seat Belts in their Vehicle
does not Bear on AMC/Jeep's Defense
Based on Plaintiffs' Failure to Use
their Seat Belts.

Plaintiffs point out that AMC/Jeep was barred by
the trial court from introducing evidence of plaintiffs'
failure to use their seat belts because there was no showing
that plaintiffs knew of the seat belts or that they made a
conscious decision not to use them.

(Resp. Br. at 54-56).

The trial court's position, as well as plaintiffs' argument
in this regard is not supported by either law or common
sense.

Even assuming that the location of the seat belts is

relevant to plaintiffs' culpability in failing to use them,
such facts only present a question for the jury to decide,
not a basis for excluding from the jury's consideration the
failure to use the belts.
In any event, plaintiffs' awareness of the seat
belts does not bear directly on the issue at hand.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There is

i

no dispute that plaintiffs1 Commando was equipped with seat
belts.

It can hardly be the fault of AMC/Jeep that those

seat belts "were under the seat" as alleged by plaintiffs.
(Resp. Br. at page 56). Alsof whether or not plaintiffs made
a "conscious decision" to eschew the use of their seat belts
is not at issue here. Whether conscious or simply unwisef
AMC/Jeep contendsf and the evidence would have shown, that
plaintiffs' failure to use their seat belts contributed to
their injuries.

The amount that plaintiffs1 damages should

have been reduced by reason of that failure is an issue for
the jury to decide.

The trial court erred in preempting this

issue of fact.
C.

The Absence of a Statutory Obligation
does not Preclude the Imposition of a
Common Law Duty to Utilize Available
Seat Belts.

Plaintiffs next argue that "there exists no statutory nor common law duty to utilize a seat belt."
at 57-60).

(Resp. Br.

AMC/Jeep has never contended that there is a Utah

or federal statute requiring one to utilize an available seat
belt.

But plaintiffs1 leap from that fact to the assertion

that no duty exists at common law to utilize a seat belt is
unsupported and unfounded.

The absence of statutory obliga-

tions to use reasonable care and to mitigate damages has been
no bar to the common law development of those doctrines.

For

example, the fact that there is no statutory obligation to
wear a crash helmet when operating a motorcycle did not deter
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Justice Oaks from stating that failure to wear a crash helmet
would be relevant to the issue of mitigation or avoidance of
damages.

Acculog, supra, at 8 n.l.
Plaintiffs argue that it is for the legislature,

not the courts, to decide whether to "penalize a plaintiff
for not using seat belts ...."

(Resp. Br. at 59, quoting

Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668 (Mont.
1980); see also id., at 60-62).

The Florida Supreme Court,

in ruling that a jury should be allowed to consider evidence
of a plaintiff's failure to use available seat belts, responded to this call for judicial restraint most convincingly:
[The plaintiff] asserts that the single
most compelling reason for such a holding
[i.e., that the jury cannot consider the
plaintiff's failure to use seat belts] is
the principle that courts are law interpreting and not lawmaking and argues that
we should not act in a peculiarly legislative manner.
We disagree and find this issue
particularly appropriate for judicial
decision. In the past, this Court has
not abdicated its continuing responsibility to the citizens of this state to
ensure that the law remains both fair and
realistic as society and technology
change. ...
To abstain from acting responsibly
in the present case on the basis of
legislative deference would be to consciously ignore a limited area where
decisions by the lower courts of this
state have created an illogical exception
to the doctrine of comparative negligence
... and the underlying philosophy of
individual responsibility ....
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Insurance Company of North America v, Pasakarnis, supra, 451
So. 2d, at 451.

I

Product liability law creates incentives for manufacturers to design and make safe products and thus promotes
the goals of tort law by limiting the risk of harm.

But loss

{

prevention and risk avoidance is not solely in the hands of
manufacturers.

Safety is a two-way street.

Despite plain-

tiffs' charge that "the seat belt defense is inappropriate in
the context of strict liability," (Resp. Br. at 69-70), the
party in the best position to promote safety may be someone
other than the manufacturer, such as the product user.
In this case, the jury should have been permitted
to consider whether and to what extent plaintiffs' failure to
utilize available seat belts contributed to their damages.
This is consistent with the Restatement's position that every
person—product user, manufacturer, and retailer—has a duty
to act reasonably by exercising "those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society
requires of its members for the protection of their own
interests and the interests of others."

Restatement (Second)

of Torts Section 283 comment b (1965) (emphasis added).

This

is the basis for tort rules relating to contributory fault,
misuse, assumption of the risk, last clear chance, avoidable
consequences, comparative causation, and mitigation of damages, all of which hold the plaintiff responsible for the
consequences of failing to exercise reasonable care for his
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own safety.

These rules apply with equal force to product

liability actions where "the user frequently can control the
risk by avoiding foolish uses or by making use of some specific knowledge about significant alternatives that are in
his or her control."
225.

Werber, supra, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev, at

See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1303

(Utah 1981), holding that it is proper for the jury to consider the faults of both plaintiff and defendant when they
"have united as concurrent proximate causes of an injury" in
strict product liability cases.
D.

Plaintiffs Fail to Respond to
AMC/Jeep's Argument that the Jury
Should have been Permitted to Consider the Fact that the Commando was
Equipped with Seat Belts in Connection with the Issue of Design
Safety.

As AMC/Jeep argued in its opening Brief, the presence of seat belts in the accident vehicle is also relevant,
in a design defect case such as this, on the question whether
the vehicle is inherently unsafe and unreasonably dangerous
because the safety of a vehicle's design cannot be fairly
evaluated if the fact finder is precluded from considering
the principal safety features designed into the vehicle for
the express purpose of providing protection to the occupants.
This Court has recognized that "[s]trict liability
in tort is not the equivalent of making the manufacturer or
seller absolutely liable as an insurer of the product and its
use."

Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1302
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(Utah 1981).

Tort law does not require automobile manufac-

turers to make "accident proof" vehicles.

Larsen v. General

Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 499 (8th Cir. 1968).

i

Such a

vehicle is impossible to make because accidents and collisions are inevitable.

Thus, a manufacturer's duty is only to

produce vehicles that are not unreasonably dangerous.

See

Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah
1979) (adopting the language of Section 402A, Restatement
(Second) of Torts, requiring the plaintiff in a strict product liability action to prove that the product at issue was
in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous to the
ultimate consumer).
Whether the manufacturer's duty has been met in a
particular case cannot be determined in a vacuum simply by
focusing on the allegedly defective aspect of the design.
Manufacturers make design decisions with the whole vehicle in
mind, balancing a wide range of considerations.

The jury in

a design defect case like this one must be given the same
opportunity to consider the vehicle as a whole. Wilson v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 (E.D.
Va. 1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162, 1174-1175 (1978).
In evaluating whether a vehicle's design taken as a
whole is reasonably safe, many factors are relevant.

See

Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33
Vand. L. Rev. 551 (1980).

The size and style of the vehicle,
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its price, and its intended uses are all pertinent.

A person

who purchases a convertible car cannot expect the kind of
protection that he would have in a hard top and the courts do
not impose a duty on the manufacturer to design a convertible
car which meets the same safety standards.

Dreisonstok v.

Wolkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072-1075 (4th Cir.
1974); Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 811-812
(10th Cir. 1981).
Consideration must also be given to the safety
features inherent in the design of the vehicle in question.
E.g., Wilson, supra, 445 F. Supp., at 1371; Daly, supra, 575
P.2d, at 1174. Cases alleging harm caused by a defect in
design, regardless of the aspect of the product impugned,
always raise questions about whether, through safety features
designed into the vehicle, the manufacturer met its duty to
design a vehicle that provides reasonable protection against
foreseeable risks of harm.
Seat belts are placed in vehicles for the express
purpose of reducing the risk of injury to vehicle occupants.
This was as true of the seat belts in plaintiffs' Commando as
it is in the case of all modern vehicles.

It is neither

feasible nor fair to determine whether a vehicle is unreasonably dangerous without considering the presence of seat
belts, the specific purpose and effect of which are to meet
the manufacturer's duty to reduce unreasonable risks of
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injury.

See Werber, supra, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev., at 253-

254.
The jury's consideration of the whole vehicle in a
design defect case like this one is particularly appropriate
in Utah.

In Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601

P.2d 152 (Utah 1979), this Court adopted the standard of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Section

402A provides, in pertinent part, that "[o]ne who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user of consumer ... is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user ...."
added).

(Emphasis

Many courts and commentators have noted that in

design defect, as opposed to manufacturing defect, cases the
"unreasonably dangerous" language of Section 402A assumes
particular relevance:
[0]ur experience teaches us that, in the
conscious design choice cases, where
there is no other (available) standard,
excision of the unreasonably dangerous
concept denudes Section 402A of its only
vehicle for infusing into the notion of
"defect" a meaningful guide to its determination. Dean Wade has written that in
(conscious) design defect cases, the
concept of defective condition standing
alone is inappropriate, and that it has
no independent meaning and is apt to
prove misleading. Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J.
15 (1965). Accord, Ross v. Up-Right,
I N c , 402 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1968). We
agree. Professor Keeton believes that,
in the area of design problem "defective"
means unreasonably dangerous. Keeton,
Product Liability and the Meaning of
Defect, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 30, 32 (1973).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Bowman v, General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 242 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (applying Pennsylvania law).
Thus, in deciding whether plaintiffs1 Commando was
defectively designed, as asserted by plaintiffs, the jury was
required to decide whether the Commando was unreasonably
dangerous.

As the court stated in an analogous case, evi-

dence that an accident vehicle had been equipped with seat
belts should be admitted for the purpose of determining
whether the vehicle was defectively designed because the jury
must determine "whether the auto as a whole was defective and
unreasonably dangerous ...."

Wilson v. Volkswagen of

America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 (E.D. Va. 1978).

It

is simply impossible to consider individual design decisions
in a vacuum because such decisions are made as part of a
myriad of design decisions that go into the manufacture of
the whole vehicle.
Plaintiffs would have it that their presentation of
but one aspect of the Commando, the strength of its roof when
subjected to a roll over, is enough to show that the Commando
was defective.

This precise argument was rejected by the

California Supreme Court in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978).

The plaintiffs in that

case sued the defendant manufacturer for damages suffered as
the result of an automobile accident.

The plaintiffs' theory

against the manufacturer was that a door latch had been
improperly designed.

At trial, and over the plaintiffs'
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objections, the defendant was permitted to introduce evidence
that the accident vehicle was equipped with a seat beltshoulder harness system, and a door lock, either of which if
used would have prevented the injury complained of.

The

plaintiffs1 lost at trial and, on appeal, challenged a jury
instruction which directed that "'[i]n determining whether or
not the vehicle was defective you should consider all of the
equipment on the vehicle including any features intended for
the safety of the driver.1"

575 P.2d, at 1174.

It was the

plaintiffs1 contention, as plaintiffs contend here, "that
only the precise malfunctioning component itself, and alone,
may be considered in determining whether injury was caused by
a defectively designed product."

_Ld. The California Supreme

Court disagreed with the plaintiffs1 contention, stating as
follows:
The jury could properly determine whether
the [accident vehicle's] overall design,
including safety features provided in the
vehicle, made it 'crashworthy,' thus
rendering the vehicle nondefective.
Product designs do not evolve in a
vacuum, but must reflect the realities of
the market place, kitchen, highway, and
shop. Similarly, a product's components
are not developed in isolation, but as
part of an integrated and interrelated
whole. Recognizing that finished products must incorporate and balance safety,
utility, competitive merit, and practicality under a multitude of intended
and foreseeable uses, courts have
struggled to evolve realistic tests for
defective design which give weight to
this necessary balancing. ... However
phrased, these decisions emphasize the
need to consider the product as an integrated whole.
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Id., at 1175.

See also McElroy v. Allstate Insurance Co.,

420 So. 2d 214 (La. App. 1982).
In this case, the Commando's roof, or even its roll
over characteristics, are no more important a part of the
vehicle than are its steering column, interior padding, door
locks, suspension and seat belts.

The trial court's exclu-

sion of any evidence relating to seat belts is no more logical than the exclusion of any other safety device that
AMC/Jeep had designed into the Commando.

In fact, the trial

court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's seat belt evidence is particularly incongruous because that evidence would have shown
that, if utilized, the seat belts would have prevented precisely the type of injury complained of by plaintiff Steven
Whitehead.

(T., 10/31/83, at 2018; R. 3806).

In effect, the

trial court barred the jury from considering the most critical safety feature designed into the Commando by AMC/Jeep.
This Court should hold that evidence of the presence of seat belts should be admitted on the issue of design
defect in this case. Admitting this evidence is a simple
matter of fairness.

It will merely allow the jury to con-

sider evidence regarding the capacity of seat belts to prevent and reduce injuries, along with all other relevant
evidence, in determining whether the vehicle, taken as a
whole, is defective and unreasonably dangerous as plaintiffs
allege.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

E.

The Trier of Fact is Capable of
Understanding and Applying Rationally
the "Seat Belt Defense"

Plaintiffs assert that evidence with respect to
seat belts and their relationship to a plaintiff's injury "is
simply too speculative to be placed in issue before a jury."
(Resp. Br. at 67-68).

A jury's task in deciding whether, and

to what extent, a plaintiff's failure to utilize available
seat belt contributed to his injury, however, is hardly more
difficult than comparative causation principles applied
regularly by Utah juries under Utah's comparative negligence
statute.

As this Court said recently, in holding that these

comparative principles are applicable in strict liability
actions, "we believe that judges and juries will have little
difficulty assigning the relative responsibility each is to
bear for a particular injury when the ultimate issues in such
comparisons are relative fault and relative causation."
Mulherin, supra, 628 P.2d, at 1304. A jury is capable of
weighing seat belt evidence in any tort action, and this case
should be remanded for a new trial so that a jury can consider the evidence proffered by AMC/Jeep.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DIRECT A VERDICT BASED ON AMC/JEEP7^
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE
AMC/Jeep has detailed the trial court's erroneous
decision to ignore AMC/Jeep's defense based on the statute of
limitations found in Utah's Product Liability Act, Section
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78-15-3, Utah Code Annotated,

(App. Br. at 68-74).

As

plaintiffs admit, the statute of limitations defense was
already before the trial court in the answer of defendant
American Motors Sales Corporation.
was filed without objection.

(R. 84-87).

That answer

At the same time American

Motors Sales Corporation filed its answer, defendant Jeep
Corporation filed a motion for leave to amend its answer,
filed previously, to bring it into accord with the answer of
American Motors Sales Corporation.

(R. 983-989).

Conceding that AMC/Jeep would have a valid defense
based on the statute's six year limitations provision, (see
Resp. Br. at 73), plaintiffs respond to AMC/Jeep's claim of
error by arguing that the trial court was justified in denying Jeep Corporation's motion to amend its answer on the
grounds that the amended answer would have delayed trial and
would have required "extensive discovery on behalf of the
plaintiff."

(Resp. Br. at 77). Plaintiffs rely on Staker v.

Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah
1983), for their argument that such amendments to pleadings
are rarely permitted at the commencement of or during trial.
Totally ignored by plaintiffs, however, is the glaring fact
which distinguishes this case from Staker and renders plaintiffs1 arguments inapposite:

The statute of limitations

issue was already properly before the trial court in the
answer of American Motors Sales Corporation.

The prejudice
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that plaintiffs claim would have resulted had Jeep Corporation's motion to amend been granted simply disappears in
light of the fact that plaintiffs had to contend with
AMC/Jeep's defense based on the statute of limitations in any
event.

Under these unique circumstances, Rule 15(a), Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, should have guided the trial court
and leave to amend should have been granted in the interests
of justice.
Plaintiffs also argue that AMC/Jeep "made absolutely no proffer of proof related to the Product Liability
Act or statute of limitations during the entire course of
trial; therefore, the issue is waived."

(Resp. Br. at 74).

The facts critical to this defense were undisputed, however,
and the trial court did not rely on any such argument in
denying AMC/Jeepfs motion for directed verdict based on the
statute of limitations.
court without comment.
4775).

The motion was denied by the trial
(T., 11/4/83, at 18-19; R. 4774-

The trial court's failure to direct a verdict on this

ground was erroneous and the trial court's judgment should
therefore be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment on the verdict cannot be
sustained and must be reversed and a new trial or the entry
of judgment for AMC/Jeep ordered for the six independently
sufficient reasons detailed in AMC/Jeep's Brief. Plaintiffs'
Brief fails to address many of the significant issues raised

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by AMC/Jeep.

The arguments to which plaintiffs have re-

sponded are not explained away or even blunted by plaintiffs'
Brief.
For all of the foregoing reasons, and for the
reasons stated in AMC/Jeepfs Brief, the judgment on the
verdict must be reversed and a new trial or the entry of
judgment for AMC/Jeep ordered.

, At

2.

DATED this ^

day of October, 1984.
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR

Thomas B. Green
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellants American Motors
Sales Corporation and
Jeep Corporation
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